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Deportation and the Refugee
Elwin Griffith*
Long ago when it was unnecessary to restrict the number of aliens entering
the United States, there was little distinction between refugees and other
immigrants. Both groups shared similar motivations and problems. Some
immigrated solely for economic reasons, while others sought new horizons
because of political or religious persecution at home. In the main, though,
the desire to immigrate was nurtured by the yearning for a better life.
After a time, however, the United States imposed numerical restrictions
on immigrants and, therefore, refugee status assumed added importance. 1
Since 1948, Congress has enacted special measures to accommodate ref-
ugees. 2 The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), in particular, solidified the refugee's place within the statutory
scheme, allowing the conditional entry and subsequent permanent status
of refugees who came from certain parts of the world. 3 The Refugee Act
of 1980 made further refinements, 4 streamlining the admissions process
for political refugees 5 by providing a systematic plan for the immigration
of those aliens for whom the United States has some special humanitarian
concern.
The framers of the Refugee Act, however, could not foresee a constant
stream of refugees from the Caribbean area and did not prepare the United
States to deal with the wave of Cuban and Haitian entrants which peaked
only after the Act's passage. The Haitians in particular pose a legal quand-
ary, raising squarely the meaningfulness of the distinction between aliens
fleeing political oppression-who benefit from U.S. refugee and asylum
law-and aliens fleeing economic deprivation, who are not likely to qualify
as statutory refugees or asylees. 6 But the Cuban-Haitian situation points
up a more general, though perhaps less emotional, issue: the problem of
dealing with aliens who assert their eligibility for special treatment not as
refugees during the visa process at an overseas U.S. consulate, but as
refugees within the United States in exclusion or deportation hearings.
* Dean, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. 1960, Long Island University; J.D. 1963,
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In the past, conditional entry visas 7 and the attorney general's parole
power 8 were available to bring in refugees from abroad; the 1980 Refugee
Act formalized the admissions process for refugees by according them a
precise status under the immigration laws. A welter of policy statements
and INS regulations formerly governed asylum applications made within
the United States, and the Refugee Act of 1980 established a regularized
statutory foundation for these too. 9 But aliens afraid to return to their
homeland have also been able to raise this fear in deportation proceedings,
and still can, after the 1980 Act. Neither the new asylum provisions nor
the refugee admission provisions supplant section 243(h) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, which formerly authorized, and now requires,
the attorney general to withhold deportation if an alien shows that expul-
sion will lead to dire consequences for him or her back home. 10 This article
discusses section 243(h) as a part of U.S. refugee law, as it has evolved over
the years into a means of relief for the alien on the brink of expulsion from
the United States.
BACKGROUND: THE NEED FOR A WITHHOLDING
OF DEPORTATION PROVISION
When the Immigration and Nationality Act was amended in 1965, a pref-
erence system was established which included refugees in the statutory
scheme. Seven preference categories allocated the total of 170,000 available
visas; 116 percent of the total were reserved initially for the seventh prefer-
ence category, but this number was increased in 1978 to 17,400 annually.
Aliens were admitted under the seventh preference for "conditional en-
try." 12 These conditional entrants were refugees of two types: aliens who
had fled Communist, Communist-dominated, or Middle Eastern countries
because of persecution or fear of persecution, 13 and aliens who were
displaced by some natural catastrophe.
Another immigration route for refugees was INA section 212(d), which
authorized the attorney general to admit refugees under emergency condi-
tions or for reasons deemed in the public interest. 14 Aliens paroled into the
United States under this authority were known as parolees. Like condi-
tional entrants, they were technically not legal residents and were deemed
not to be "within" the United States. Thus they remained subject to
exclusion, rather than deportation, until their status was adjusted. Howev-
er, they could stay as long as the emergency existed which gave rise to their
admission. 15 Parole was a rather flexible device for the admission of aliens
who might be inadmissible otherwise. 16 Theoretically, the parole provi-
sion was used to counterbalance other refugee provisions which operated
in favor of those fleeing Communist territory. In practice, however, a
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significant number of parolees came from Communist countries. 17 With
the introduction of the conditional entry provision in 1965,18 Congress
intended that parole should be available only on an individual basis; in this
respect it impliedly rejected parole as a supplementary means for the
admission of groups of refugees who could not fulfill the normal statutory
requirements for immigrants. 19
Conditional entry and parole were the appropriate vehicles for aliens
seeking refuge from outside the United States. Since 1980 the vehicle has
been admission as a refugee. Sometimes, though, aliens already within U.S.
borders are afraid to return to their homelands. Upon the expiration of
their authorized stay, they would prefer to remain in the United States.
Yet, remaining without permission, or other events-for example, convic-
tion of a serious crime, illegal entry across the border, engaging in subver-
sive activities, membership in the Communist party-subjects aliens to
deportation. 20 Deportation proceedings, however, do not inexorably result
in expulsion. INA section 243(h) may provide the alien the relief he or she
desires.
SECTION 243(h) BEFORE THE 1980 REFUGEE ACT
Before 1950 there was nothing in the immigration law providing for the
deferment of deportation if an alien feared persecution at his or her desti-
nation. It was clear that something had to be done to deal with this
situation. In 1950 a provision was enacted which required the attorney
general to suspend deportation upon a finding that the alien would be
subject to physical persecution on return to his or her native land. 21 If the
alien raised a persecution claim, the attorney general had to make a fact
determination that the alien would not be subject to persecution if deport-
ed. Section 243(h), as originally written into the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act in 1952, merely authorized, rather than required, the attorney
general to suspend deportation if the physical persecution requirement
was met. 22 This discretionary approach had more to do with the limited
judicial review and the function of the attorney general in assessing the
likelihood of persecution than with the possibility of the attorney general's
rejecting a claim if the probability of persecution was proved. However,
the original section provided rather narrow relief; the alien had to show
the possibility of torture, or even of death, to meet the physical persecution
test, 23 although some courts held that depriving an alien of all means of
earning a livelihood would constitute physical persecution. 24 In 1965,
Congress deleted the word "physical" and authorized the attorney general
to withhold deportation if the alien would be subject to persecution on
account of "race, religion, or political opinion." 25 The deletion of the word
128 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES
"physical" convinced some courts that experiencing substantial economic
disadvantage was sufficient to invoke the statute. 26 In any event, the
amendment broadened the provision's application, 27 obviating the neces-
sity for the alien to show the probability of bodily harm, and permitting
courts to emphasize the motivation behind the persecution rather than the
results of the oppression. 28 A closer look was taken at the grounds under-
lying the persecution. It was this aspect that would prove troublesome later
on because it was soon evident that not every form of persecution would
qualify the alien for relief.
The 1965 amendment to section 243(h) did not change the discretionary
nature of the relief provided. The attorney general was still authorized, not
required, to withhold deportation if the alien would be subject to persecu-
tion. 29 This language providing for the exercise of discretion seemed to
mirror other INA provisions permitting discretionary relief in deportation
proceedings. 30 These other provisions suggested a two-step process in
fashioning a remedy. First, the alien had to establish statutory eligibility,
and then the attorney general could exercise administrative discretion
either in favor of, or against, the alien. 31 But under section 243(h), the
more apposite approach seemed to be to regard the attorney general's
discretion as applying to the entire review of the probability that the alien
would be persecuted; if persecution was likely, then the attorney general
was expected to withhold deportation. 32 In other words, if the attorney
general determined that an alien would be persecuted back home, he could
not then decide to deport the alien in the face of that determination.
The attorney general could exercise his discretion to withhold deporta-
tion only if the alien was within the United States. In this context the word
"within" was significant because physical presence was not the same as
being within the United States for purposes of the statute. 33 Thus, an alien
detained by authorities at the border, or allowed in, pending a determina-
tion of admissibility, was not regarded as "within" the United States
although he or she was physically present. 34 The same problem arose in
determining whether the alien had made an "entry" into the United States,
a prerequisite of being "within" the country. A parolee or a conditional
entrant was unable to take advantage of the pre-1980 version of section
243(h), because he or she was not "within" the United States for the
purposes of the statute. 35
However, an alien who gained admission through fraud could request
protection of the statute because he or she was within the United States,
even though illegally. In a word, the alien who was subject to exclusion
proceedings because he or she was not "within" the country could not
invoke section 243(h) because that section was applicable only to deporta-
tion proceedings. And although procedural safeguards are present in exclu-
sion proceedings, they are a creature of statute rather than of the
REFUGEE ENTRY: UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVES 129
Constitution. The section 243(h) remedy was therefore just one more
example of the difference between the two proceedings.
THE UN REFUGEE PROTOCOL AND SECTION 243(h)
In 1968 the United States acceded to the United Nations Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, which incorporated by reference the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees. 36 These instruments do not require
contracting states to accept refugees, but do codify certain minimal protec-
tions for aliens.
When the United States became a party to the Protocol, the language
of the Convention differed in some respects from the relevant immigration
statutes of the United States. Because of assurances that the Protocol
would bring about no substantial change in domestic law, 3 7 accession to
the Protocol did not result in any change in immigration procedures. How-
ever, despite legislative assurances, questions arose about the effect of
Articles 32 38 and 33 39 of the Convention on INA section 243(h). Article
32 prohibits expulsion of a refugee lawfully within the territory of a state,
unless the refugee poses a threat to national security or public order;
Article 33 prohibits expelling any refugee to a country where his or her life
or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a social group, or political opinion, except if the refugee is
a danger to the security of the country of refuge or has been convicted of
a serious crime and thus is a danger to the community.
In In re Dunar40 the Board of Immigration Appeals addressed the Proto-
col's effect on INA section 241, which provided for deportation, and sec-
tion 243(h). The alien in Dunar had argued that, as a refugee who had
entered the United States lawfully, his deportation was precluded under
Article 32 of the Convention, which was binding on the United States
through its accession to the Protocol. The board viewed the Protocol as a
treaty, because it incorporated and supplemented the substantive provi-
sions of the Convention. Thus the Protocol had the same effect as an Act
of Congress, 41 and the board needed to determine whether the later Proto-
col affected the INA. The board looked to the general principle that a
subsequent treaty does not repeal an act of Congress unless the two are
incompatible and cannot be reconciled. 42 The board found that the
grounds for deportation in section 241 were still operative against a refugee
because most of them could be construed as having some basis in national
security or public order, the two grounds for expulsion of a refugee al-
lowed under Article 32. Thus, the board held that Article 32 did not
prevent a state from deporting an alien who had overstayed his visit of his
own accord because he was not at that point lawfully within the United
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States. 43 The only refugees who benefit from Article 32 appear to be those
aliens who would otherwise be deportable under the mental illness or
public charge provisions of section 241, for these cannot be characterized
as Article 32 exceptions. 44
Article 1 of the Convention requires an alien, to qualify as a refugee,
to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. The alien in Dunar argued
that his deportation should be stayed on the basis of Article 33 because
of his subjective fear of persecution, an interpretation seemingly inconsist-
ent with the burden of proof previously required under section 243(h),
which was that the alien show a clear probability of persecution. The board
found that this difference between the Article 33 and established board
standards did not provide a firm basis for changing the established burden
of proof requirement. Dunar's contention that his fear of persecution
should be governed by a subjective test was not upheld. Had this argument
prevailed, it would have changed the standard applied in previous cases by
emphasizing the alien's state of mind rather than an objective assessment
of the probability of persecution in the nation of origin. 4
5
Section 243(h) applied to persecution on account of "race, religion, or
political opinion." Articles 1 and 33 of the Convention include these
grounds as well as persecution on the basis of "nationality" and member-
ship of a particular "social group." The five bases of persecution in Articles
1 and 33 were similar to the three set out in section 243(h). Congress
intended to protect aliens who were characterized as members of certain
unpopular groups. Thus, the board's treatment of the section 243(h) perse-
cution grounds as if they were subsumed under those Articles 1 and 33
certainly promoted the basic objectives of the section. Furthermore, the
threat to life or freedom envisaged by Article 33 would also constitute
persecution within the meaning of section 243(h). Thus, in Dunar, the
board was satisfied that the differences in terminology could be reconciled
without any difficulty, 46 thus settling any doubts which existed about the
fact that Article 33 did not displace section 243(h).
In ruling against Dunar, the board had to determine the nature of the
decision that the attorney general was called upon to make under section
243(h), in light of the mandate in Article 33 that a refugee not be expelled
to a place where his or her life or freedom would be threatened. Section
243(h) authorized, but did not compel, the attorney general to withhold
deportation. Some cases viewed the attorney general's discretion broad-
ly. 47 The board took the view that the discretion contemplated under
section 243(h) was not curtailed by Article 33 because there was no case
where the attorney general had denied a stay of deportation to an alien
who proved the probability of persecution. Therefore, the board found
that Article 33 did not change the application of section 243(h) "either by
way of burden of proof, coverage, or manner of arriving at decisions." 
48
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The Refugee Act of 1980 resolves most of the issues raised in Dunar, as
it brings the U.S. definition of refugee in line with that in the Convention
and Protocol, 49 and adopts the Article 33 language in revised section
243(h). 50 This harmonization should lessen any future tension between
section 243(h) and the international obligations assumed by the United
States in acceding to the Protocol.
THE 1980 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 243(h)
Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act of 1980 amended INA section 243(h) in
several significant ways. The attorney general is now required, and not
merely authorized, to withhold deportation of an alien to a country where
the alien's life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 51
Thus, the troublesome discretion problem is resolved, and the grounds
underlying the threat have been expanded to conform to the provision in
the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 52 Sec-
tion 243(h) is not available to an alien who has persecuted others or who
may have committed a serious nonpolitical crime prior to arrival in the
United States. 53
Another change brought about by the 1980 amendments to section
243(h) is that relief is no longer limited to deportation proceedings. 5 4 The
alien may also request relief in exclusion proceedings, which normally
apply to aliens who have not gained "entry" to the United States. That
change obviates the difficulty of determining whether the alien is "within"
the United States or merely physically present. It enables aliens to stake
their claims to relief without having to deal with technical distinctions
normally applicable to exclusion and deportation. A threat to life or free-
dom is the same against an alien clamoring for admission in an exclusion
proceeding or against one resisting expulsion in a deportation hearing.
CONCLUSION
The Refugee Act of 1980 has wrought order out of chaos. The amended
section 243(h) has brought some consistency to the treatment to be accord-
ed to an alien whose life or freedom would be threatened if he or she were
deported to a particular country. The admonition not to deport or return
such an alien comports with the language of Article 33 of the Convention.
In light of the change, it is entirely possible that some aliens who would
not have qualified before will benefit now from the new language.
The mere existence of widespread persecution has not been sufficient to
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invoke section 243(h). Membership in a particular social group will hence-
forth provide an additional basis for relief. This might accommodate those
aliens who feel threatened because of their identification with a certain
segment of society. This expansion of the categories qualifying for consid-
eration will allow for a new focus. However, in another sense, the statute
has become more restrictive because there must be threats to life or free-
dom rather than mere persecution. To the extent that persecution often
takes the form of imprisonment, the statute works little change in this
respect. Possibly the new language will provide a better basis for ad-
judicating aliens' claims even when there is no history of political involve-
ment.
Section 243(h) has undergone changes over the years. It has gone from
a requirement of "physical persecution" to one of "persecution," and
finally to that of threats to "life or freedom." But the effect of these
changes will be felt only through judicial and administrative decisions
which recognize the intent of this legislative action.
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or deny a stay of deportation); U.S. ex rel Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953)
(use of information by immigration commissioner not disclosed to alien petitioner does not
violate due process as power to withhold deportation is exercised solely at discretion of
attorney general).
48 14 I. & N. Dec. at 323. See also Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.), vacated
on other grounds, 434 U.S. 962 (1977); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977).
49 Compare Convention, supra note 9, art. 1 with Refugee Act of 1980, § 201 (to be codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).
50 Compare Conventi6n, supra note 9, art. 33(1), with Refugee Act of 1980, § 203(e) (to be
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)).
51 Refugee Act of 1980, § 203(e) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)).
52 Two additional grounds added in section 243(h) are "nationality" or "membership in
a particular social group." But cf 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES (American Council for Nationalities
Service) 133, 135 (1980):
The amended provision thus both expands and narrows the available relief. On the
one hand, the bases for persecution are broadened and relief is made mandatory. On
the other hand, the alien must show that his/her life or freedom would be threatened
rather than that he or she would be subject to persecution.
53 Refugee Act of 1980, § 203(e) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h)). The Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has published HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK] which sug-
gests a balancing test for determining whether a crime is a serious nonpolitical crime. HAND-
BOOK, para. 156.
In In re Rodriguez-Palma, Int. Dec. No. 2185 (BIA Aug. 26, 1980), the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals had its first opportunity since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 to decide
whether an alien had committed a "serious non-political crime." Since neither the Act nor
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the Convention defines the term "serious non-political crime," the Board looked for guidance
to the UNHCR Handbook. The Handbook takes a rather straightforward approach by suggesting
that a serious crime within this context must be "a capital crime or a very grave punishable
act." HANDBOOK, para. 155. However the Handbook also suggests balancing the nature of the
crime committed and the degree of persecution feared. The Board in In re Rodriguez-Palma
found that the alien was ineligible for relief, either by applying the balancing test to the
nature of the crime and the degree of persecution feared, or simply by considering the nature
of the crime itself.
The Refugee Act of 1980 permits the attorney general to waive certain criminal provisions
of § 212(a) of the INA in order that the alien may still be eligible for relief. Refugee Act of
1980, § 201(b) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157); INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). This suggests that in this situation Congress had the balancing test in mind.
In determining whether the crime is political or nonpolitical, some consideration must be
given to the motive behind its commission. If the crime is to be characterized as political, there
should be a direct connection between the crime and the purported political objectives.
HANDBOOK, para. 152. The political aspect of the offense should also outweigh its common law
character. It would be difficult, however, to appreciate the political nature of the crime if it
involved acts that were particularly cruel or repulsive. In any event, all the circumstances
surrounding a particular act should be taken into account in determining whether a crime is
nonpolitical. HANDBOOK, para. 157.
54 The amended section 243(h) prevents the deportation or return of any alien who meets
the section's criteria, whereas the former section affected only aliens "within the United
States." The omission of that language in the new section cleared up any lingering doubts
about the section's application. Compare Refugee Act of 1980, § 203(e), with INA § 243(h), 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976). In the regulations dealing with asylum procedures, the following
language is used in one of the sections: "Nothing in this part, however, shall be construed
to prevent an alien from requesting relief under section 243(h) during exclusion or deporta-
tion proceedings." 45 Fed. Reg. 37,395 (1980) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.11). See also 45
Fed. Reg. 37,394 (1980) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.3), where asylum requests made after
exclusion or deportation proceedings have begun are treated as requests to withhold exclu-
sion or deportation under section 243(h).
